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1. Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?
1 Since the second half of the 19th century, the natural and human sciences were charged
with  facing  fresh  questions  raised  by  evolutionary  theory.  In  particular,  the  human
sciences needed to contend with the limits of their pre-Darwinian paradigms and to call
into question the methodological and metaphysical assumptions that underlay them. In
the United States,  William James published the Principles  of  Psychology in 1890.  Whilst
James never abandoned his epochè concerning the causes of the phylogenetic evolution of
human consciousness,  evolutionism influenced his  thought  profoundly  (James  1987).1
Integrating the results  of  recent  research in physiology and animal  psychology with
philosophical reflections, James (1955: 2) advanced the idea that the faculty of mind “does
not exist absolutely, but works under conditions.” Mind has to be considered as a functional
and dynamic element which selects stimuli from reality useful for the achievement of
some immediate,  as  well  as  remote,  ends,  influencing the environment in which the
subject lives (James 1955: 116 ss.).2
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2 James’ work on psychology re-invigorated work on the subject and, following him, John
Dewey and George Herbert Mead, both at the University of Chicago from 1894, developed
their psychological researches into human behavior undertaken in 1892 at the University
of Michigan,  laying the foundations for the Chicago School of  Functional Psychology.
Furthermore, in 1896 James R. Angell and Addison W. Moore undertook a psychological
experiment on attention and habit under the guidance of Dewey and Mead (Angell &
Moore 1896).
3 The spirit of theoretical and methodological innovation which encouraged psychological
and sociological studies at the University of Chicago involved all the departments of the
University. In this innovative and stimulating environment, Thorstein Veblen, who joined
Chicago  in  1892  experienced  what  Hodgson  describes  as  his  academic  epiphany.
According  to  Hodgson (1998),  Veblen’s  thought  underwent  an  intellectual  revolution
during the years 1896-1899,  stimulated by a number of  debates in biology and social
theory he assisted in during that period.3 It is not by chance that, between 1898 and 1899,
he  published,  besides  The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class,  a  series  of  articles  in  which he
criticized orthodox economic theories, highlighting their static and abstract nature and
obsolescence and claiming for a methodological revolution in economics in favor of a
paradigm shift which should heed recent psychology.4
4 In  particular,  in  1898  Veblen  published  an  article  against  the  taxonomic  nature  of
orthodox economic science. He portrayed economists as “unable to handle its subject
matter in such a way as to earn it standing as a modern science” (Veblen 1898a: 373).
Veblen accused orthodox economic theories of being short-sighted for merely focusing
upon material elements that compound economic institutions. Supported by a symbolic,
often ambiguous, use of language, orthodox economics referred to a theoretical model
rooted in some metaphysical assumptions which considered nature as the expression of a
pre-ordered and aim-oriented structure,  and that  considered the human agent as  an
element of this system. Hence economic theories were rooted in a habit of thought that,
through an expedient of abstract reason, referred to homo oeconomicus as inserted in a
competitive  system which  elaborates  fixed  economic  laws  totally  detached  from the
becoming of reality and of human actions.
5 From such a perspective, the theory was unable to catch the dynamic and evolving nature
of the history of the individual’s economic life, preferring to characterize it as a feat of
scientific imagination (Veblen 1899b: 422-3). In other words, in lieu of being the product of
a  process  of  adaptation  of  means  and  ends  subject  to  the  becoming  of  human
evolutionary  processes,  economics  revealed  it  to  be  a  deductive  science  which
consolidated a mechanism of conservation of equilibrium reflecting a natural law order.
This conservative, static representation of reality was legitimated by faith in a progre
ssive cumulative tendency that had not been abandoned with the shift from the pre-
Darwinian to the Darwinian perspective. Hence economic theories maintained unaltered
the idea that a stability of causal law is the product of a process of gradual amelioration of
the phenomena of social and economic sciences. The perspectives of classical economists
since Smith could be defined as the perspective of a ceremonial adaptation:
The ultimate laws and principles which they formulated were laws of the normal or
the natural, according to a preconception regarding the ends to which in the nature
of things, all things tend. In effect, this preconception imputes to things a tendency
to work out what the instructed common sense of the time accepts as the adequate
or worthy end of human effort. It is a projection of the accepted ideal of conduct.
This ideal of conduct is made to serve as a canon of truth, to the extent that the
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investigator contents himself with an appeal to its legitimation for premises that
run back of the facts with which he is immediately dealing, for the “controlling
principles” that are conceived intangibly to underlie the process discussed and for
the “tendencies” that run beyond the situation as it lies before him. (Veblen 1898a:
382)
6 One  instance  of  this  way  of  conceiving  knowledge  was  “conjectural  history”  in  the
classical  treatment  of  economic  institutions,  as  well  as  the  affective  metaphors  for
money, depicted as “the great wheel of circulation” (Smith 1904: II, 2, 26).
7 As noted by Veblen, such “figurative,” “metaphoric,” “inscrutable” linguistic forms were
used as “ultimate terms” by economists aiming to construct theories such as those of
money  and  wages,  referring  to  their  concrete  implications  just  to  corroborate  their
thesis. In so doing, Veblen continued, 
the ways and means and the mechanical structure of industry are formulated in a
conventionalized  nomenclature,  and  the  observed  motions  of  this  mechanical
apparatus are then reduced to a normalized scheme of relations. (Veblen 1898a:
383)
8 The  scheme  becomes  “spiritually  binding  on  the  behavior  of  the  phenomena
contemplated” and the permutations of a given segment of the apparatus are worked out
“according  to  the  values  assigned  the  several  items  and  features  comprised  in  the
calculation.” This is the “deductive method,” composed of
a  body  of  logically  consistent  propositions  concerning  the  normal  relations  of
things – a system of economic taxonomy. At its worst, it is a body of maxims for the
conduct of business and a polemical discussion of disputed points of policy. (Veblen
1898a: 384)
 
2. Veblen’s Notion of “Habit” between Peirce’s Logic
and James’ Psychology
9 What  are  we  going  to  do  about  it?,  asked  Veblen.  His  reply  was  a  plea  for  a
methodological  revolution  in  economics  that  seems  now  to  be  analogous  to  those
implemented by Copernicus in the study of nature and Kant in epistemology. Such a
methodological revolution consisted in shifting one’s attention from material elements
belonging  to  economic  taxonomy,  and  clustered  under  the  conceptual  category  of
“capital,” conceived as “a mass of material objects serviceable for human use” (Veblen
1898a: 387), to the human agent as the subject matter of the science. It is the human agent
that changes,  reflects,  evaluates,  selects the materials.  The accumulation of materials
already  to  hand conditions  the  utilization  of  material  offered,  but  such a  limitation
pertains to what the human agent can do and their method of doing it. And the continuity
of development is to be looked for in human material. It is the human agent who is the
motor force of the process of economic development that thus needs to be studied by
economic science.  Such a new approach allows economics to become a social  science
which can reckon with the research results  and studies of  other human and natural
sciences. The material objects are:
Substantially, prevalent habits of thought, and it is as such that they enter into the
process  of  industrial  development.  The  physical  properties  of  the  material
accessible to man are constants: it is the human agent that changes – his insight
and his appreciation of what these things can be used for is what develops. (Veblen
1898a: 387-8)
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10 Veblen’s notion of “habits of thought” is here very close to Peirce’s notion of “habits of
mind.” Whilst we do not find direct mention of Peirce’s theory of logic in Veblen’s
writings, we know that Veblen was acquainted with Peirce’s logic for he had assisted in
Peirce’s lessons in logic at John Hopkins University in 1881 (Dorfman 1935: 41).5
11 In 1877 Peirce had published The Fixation of Belief, in which he had defined the habit of
mind as the result of an act of natural selection consisting in the capacities of human
beings to elaborate inferences which validity is verified by their practical applications. In
other words, human agents are able to select inferences useful to practical ends through a
process of logical evaluation of the possible advantages of certain inferences rather than
others.  Hence  the  function  of  thought  is  to  produce  some  habits  of  action  and,
consequently, the meanings of objects and ideas result from the appreciation of implied
practical consequences. As Peirce argued:
We are,  doubtless,  in the main logical  animals,  but we are not perfectly so […].
Logicality in regard to practical matters (if this be understood, not in the old sense,
but as consisting in a wise union of security with fruitfulness of reasoning) is the
most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from the
action of natural selection; but outside of these it is probably of more advantage to
the  animal  to  have  his  mind  filled  with  pleasing  and  encouraging  visions,
independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection
might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. (CP 5.366)
12 Besides  the  inferential  ability,  Peirce’s  definition  of  human being  as  ‘logical  animal’
emphasizes  characters  influencing  a  person’s  beliefs  and  way  of  acting,  namely  her
behavioral  dispositions.  As  Peirce  argued in  How to  Make  Our  Ideas  Clear,  “the  whole
function of thought is to produce habits of action” (CP 5.400). What a thing means is what
habit of action it involves, and what the habit is depends on when it causes the person to
act,  that  is  when the perception causes the stimulus to action,  and how it  causes to
produce some sensible result, that is some purpose of action. As Peirce puts it, “there is
no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
practice” (CP 5.400).
13 The feeling of belief is a more or less sure indication of there being some habits which will
determine our actions that are embedded in our nature. What the habit is depends on
when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from
perception; as for the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result.
Thus, we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every
real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be.
14 According to Veblen, in this regard the human agent appreciates the material objects
useful to their ends, that is to say, the human agent attributes meanings to things that
they select as means for their ends. Veblen too, like Peirce, rejected causal mechanisms,
in favor of the active dimension of human thinking and acting.6 Such active dimension is
at the core of the evolutionary advancement of human reasoning in the fixation of beliefs
which “guide our desires and shape our actions” (CP 5.371). As Griffin points out, then,
Veblen  is  indebeted  to  Peirce  for  a  social  theory  of  logic  “which  envisioned  the
advancement of human reasoning from the tenacity of fixed beliefs to an education of
attitudes and methods of science” (Griffin 1998: 750).7
15 If on the one hand Peirce’s logic offered Veblen the notion of habits of thought and the
general process of the fixation of beliefs, on the other, James’ psychology offered Veblen
the basis for a psychological  explanation of the development of habits.  In particular,
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James’ functionalism offered him a psychological explanation of the differentiation of
social ends and interests that accompany the changing processes of habits of thought.
16 More  precisely,  James  distinguished  between  habits  as  instincts,  effects  of  an  innate
tendency, and habits as acts of  reason,  “due to education,” and defined habits as “the
enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” (James 1890: 79).8 At
the basis of this distinction is the core of James’ hypothesis about human consciousness
according to which the activation of consciousness is due to a “lucky chance,” but by
virtue of the hereditary influence of habits, in its choice of interests, a more and more
unstable nervous system has been determined across generations. Hence consciousness
had the power of exerting a constant pressure in the direction of survival, giving the
organism the power of  acceding to the modes in which consciousness has trained it
(James 1983: 54). The development of habits is then strictly related to the moral problem
of selecting the correct processes of habitual relationships strenuously resisting wrong
alternatives.  This  is  also true in the modification of  knowledge processes and in the
scientific  theory  as  that  of  economics.  In  claiming  to  favor  a  ‘reconstruction  in
economics,’ Veblen referred implicitly to a Jamesian explanation of habits, arguing that:
The canons of knowledge are of the nature of habits of thought, and habit does not
break with the past, nor do the hereditary aptitudes that find expression in habit
vary gratuitously  with the mere lapse of  time.  What is  true in this  respect,  for
instance, in the domain of law and institutions is true, likewise, in the domain of
science. What men have learned to accept as good and definitive for the guidance of
conduct and of human relations remains true and definitive and unimpeachable
until the exigencies of a later, altered situation enforce a variation from the norms
and canons of the past, and so give rise to a modification of the habits of thought
that decide what is, for the time, right in human conduct. (Veblen 1900: 240-1)
17 Strongly  reinforced  by  modern  sciences,  the  changes  in  human  life  that  industrial
revolutions have generated, have divested the knowledge of non-human phenomena of
that  teleological  self-directing  life  that  was  one  imputed  to  them,  reducing  this
knowledge  to  therms  of  opaque  causal  sequence.  As  Veblen  argued,  non-human
phenomena have not been supplanted by the equally uncouth denomination of habits,
propensities, aptitudes, and conventions, even if these notions are at the basis of a way of
considering  non-human  phenomena  in  economic  science.  So  it  is  necessary  to  shift
attention  to  those  human  phenomena  that  appeal  the  psychological  dimension  of
economic human conduct. And this is possible only if economic science adopts the idea of
an undetermined science and an undetermined universe, the object of an explanation
that would take steps from an inductive non-a priori approach and consider the evolution
of  habits  of  thought  as  the  product  of  a  process  of  adaptation  in  which  some
methodological assumptions about different forms of human knowledge are involved.
18 Veblen’s references to functionalist psychology are present in both Why is Economics not an
Evolutionary Science? and in The Preconceptions of Economic Science. Veblen refers to later
psychology as biological, arguing that “the base of action – and economic action – at any
step in the process is the entire organic complex of habits of thought that have been shaped
by past process” (Veblen 1898a: 392-3).
19 Use of notions such as “organic activities,” “propensities,” “aptitudes” suggests not only
Veblen’s  knowledge  of  James’  psychology,  but  also  that  Veblen was  acquainted with
Dewey’s work on the reflex arc concept in psychology (Dewey 1896) and probably also
Dewey’s  (1894,  1895)  and Mead’s  (1895,  2001)  works  on emotion as  well  as  with the
experiments  on  attention  and  habit  that  Angell  and  Moore  (1896)  refined  at  the
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University  of  Chicago in  that  period.9 There  is  no  direct  mention of  these  works  in
Veblen’s  writings  of  these  years,  nevertheless  Veblen’s  conception  of  science  and
economic rationality seems to have been influenced more by Dewey’s and Mead’s theory
of the “organic circuit” rather than James’ functionalism.10
 
3. Veblen’s References to Dewey’s and Mead’s
Functionalist Psychology
20 In The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology (Dewey 1896), the manifesto of Chicago School of
psychological functionalism, Dewey proposed a new psychological theory aiming to re-
direct  the  attention  of  experimental  psychology  from  the  ontological  mind-body
distinction to the ‘organic  relation’  between stimuli  and response considered from a
functionalistic perspective. In particular, he denounced the dualistic perspective of that
experimental psychology which considered psychical phenomena statically, and called
for an interpretation of human sensations, thinking, and actions as stages of the human
act.  Rather  than  a  mechanistic  explanation  of the  relation  stimulus-response,  he
advanced the idea of a “sensorial circuit” highlighting the organic nature of the sense-
motor  process  in  which  stimulus,  selection,  and  motor  response  are  considered  as
intertwined  and  interdependent  stages  instead  of  discrete  and  separated  elements.
According to Dewey, stimuli are not prior to an organism’s capacity to select them, for
the distinction between stimulus and response presupposes a dynamic sensorial process
through which the perceiving organism becomes aware of the sensible stimulus at the
moment at which it is useful for the restoration of an interrupted act.
21 Whilst Dewey had in 1886 already suggested the idea of an “organic relation” between
subject and object sustaining a ‘proto-functionalistic’ psychology (while still framed in an
idealistic conceptual background),11 it was only after the reading of James’ Principles of
Psychology, together with the onset of the intellectual collaboration with Mead and the
move to Chicago, that Dewey abandoned definitively the idealistic framework in order to
embrace the functionalistic  experimental  approach to  psychology.  Between 1894 and
1895 he published two articles on the matter of emotions – “The Theory of Emotions:
Emotional Attitude” and “The Theory of Emotions:  The Significance of Emotion” – in
which, using an almost completely functionalist conceptual apparatus, he sketched his
own map of an organic theory of emotions.12
22 Actually,  Dewey’s  theory of  emotion was  not  his  own product  solely.  Dewey himself
admitted his debt to Mead concerning both the description of the relationship between
vegetative  functions  and  motor  functions,  and  the  hypothesis  about  non-human
emotional attitudes. As he wrote to Angell in 1893:
Among other things next year, Mead and I are going to try to experiment on mental
images, with a view to getting some results on attention and on rhythm. Mead is
also trying to work out something on sensation on the biological side.  All  of us
recognize, that sensation, especially its qualitative features, has been the sticking
point to a successful statement of idealism. He is trying to see if one could get back
of the present qualities and show the sensation as a condensation or precipitation
of  past  organic  activities,  so  that  everything  which  is  aesthetic  now  was  once
practical or teleological. I do not [if] this brief statement conveys the thought, but it
seems to me one of the most important working hypotheses turned up lately.13
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23 When Dewey and Mead arrived at the University of Chicago in 1894, they worked on the
formulation of a psychology which would include a theory of consciousness in terms of
organic functions. In particular, they elaborated a phylogenetic hypothesis concerning
consciousness from the sensory-motor processes,  so overtaking both the limits  of  an
idealistic interpretation of sensations and the risks of a reductionist physicalism. In other
words,  they  searched  for  a  psychology  which  had  to  be  founded  empirically.  Their
research  produced  a  theory  of  emotion  the  aim  of  which  was  to  overcome  James’
individualistic theory of emotion through a re-evaluation of the active role natural and
social environments play in the emergence of emotions.
24 In particular, referring to both Darwin’s and James’ theories of emotions, Dewey argued
that at the origin of emotion there is  the interruption of an act and that the bodily
expression of emotion is the expression of some attitudes of action “adjusted to some
end” (Dewey 1895: 162). Dewey considered the expression of certain emotional attitudes
as the marks of the passing over of emotional attitude into communicative gesture,14
arguing that there is a division between movements that are preparatory to a set of acts
and movements that are useful in themselves as accomplished ends, the first being the
expression of attitudes the culmination of which is the performance of the act. As he
wrote: 
Emotion in its entirety is a mode of behavior [my italics] which is purposive or has an
intellectual  content,  and which also reflects  itself  into feeling or Affects,  as  the
subjective valuation of that which is objectively expressed in the idea or purpose.
(Dewey 1895: 170-1)
25 In other words,  the emotion is  aroused when the unification with activity is  broken,
calling for both a tension of intellectual recognition and the consideration of how to
behave towards the object recognized:
The emotion is, psychologically, the adjustment or tension of habit and ideal,  and the
organic changes in the body are the literal working out, in concrete terms, of the
struggle of adjustment. (Dewey 1895: 185)15
26 Dewey referred to  ‘behavior’  as  a  pivotal  element  for  the  emotion.  In  particular,  he
indicated ‘behavior’ as “the ideal content of emotion” (Dewey 1895: 185). Behavior is then
the center of the condensation of organic activities in which emotional attitude creates a
tension between some behavioral habits and the ideal situations.16
27 A two-pages abstract  of  a  paper Mead presented at  the third annual  meeting of  the
American Psychological  Association of 1894 (Mead 1895),  and other fragments on the
relation between evolution, the development of intelligence, and the control of emotion,
passion, or reflex action testify Mead’s contribution to Dewey’s theory.17 In these papers
Mead proposed an explanation of organic activities tracing in their processes the passage
from sensori-motor behavioral attitudes to reflections. More interested than Dewey in
the biological processes, Mead was engaged from the beginning of his career in searching
for a solution to the question concerning the phylogeny of consciousness,  and in his
contribution to Dewey’s theory hypothesized that it was possible to find the passage from
sensorial  to  symbolic  stimulus  in  the  qualitative  differentiation  of  emotional  tones
expressed in the different instinctive attitudes.
28 According  to  Mead,  the  arousal  of  emotional  tones  of  consciousness  that  lie  in  the
physiological  reply  to  symbolic  stimuli  connected  to  the  rhythmical  repetition  of
physiological stimulation. In particular, the rhythmical aspect which is at the basis of
human actions,18 represents the link between symbolic stimuli which have an aesthetic
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value expressed at the beginning in war and love dances in primitive populations and the
instinctive acts at their basis. As Mead wrote:
It  is  under the influence of stimuli  of  this general  character that the emotional
states and their physiological parallels arise. The teleology of these states is that of
giving the organism an evaluation of the act before the coordination that leads to
the particular reaction has been completed. (Mead 1895: 164)
 
3.1 Instinct, Behavior, and Social Evolution
29 Dewey’s  and  Mead’s  works  inserted  themselves  into  ongoing  debates  on  the
methodologies and notions to be used in the new science of empirical psychology. Since
the publication of Theodor Fechner’s Elemente der Psychophysik (1860), psychophysics had
been proposing a natural method to measure the sensory stimulus-response mechanism,
interpreting the intensity of the stimulus with causal physical laws. However, the debate
around the psychophysical  measurement did not yield useful  results and pragmatists
were aware of this. In 1885 Peirce and Jastrow published the results of experiments on
small differences of sensation that showed the methodological limits of a psychophysical
measurement  of  conscious  states.  Dewey  (1887)  also  pointed  out  the  limits  of  a
psychophysical measurement in his review of Ladd’s Elements of Physiological Psychology
(the first American publication on physiological psychology). And in 1894 Mead accused
physicists to do not consider the fact that the only way to trace the distinction between
the psychical and the physical characters of perceptions was to distinguish “between the
world  as  composed of  means and of  ends”  (Mead 1894:  23;  emphasis  added),  namely
between  sensations  that  are  means  acting  as  stimuli  and  “ends  or  purposes  in
consciousness” (Mead 1894: 23).
30 And if  the  psychological  debate  was  not  resolved,  a  fortiori  it  was  not  resolved  in
economics,  as  highlighted by Veblen.  Analogously to psychophysics’  reduction of  the
qualitative intensity of sensation to the quantitative magnitude of its physical stimulus,
utilitarians reduced happiness to a calculus of pleasure and pain, considering intensity
and its duration as the only dimension belonging properly to feeling and that intensity of
feeling  is  the  instantaneous  state  that  determines  the  degree  of  utility.  Hence  they
determine quantitatively its maximization “by purchasing pleasure, as it  were, at the
lowest cost of pain” (Jevons 1888: 23) and identifying “the physical objects or actions”
with the source of  pleasure and pains (Jevons 1888:  37).  The background of  such an
economic framework was a methodological a priori approach to human conduct based
upon the hedonistic psychological assumption that actual impulsions are effects of the
“obscure” demand of  pleasure.  As  in the psychophysics  measurement the qualitative
dimension of  sensation was reduced to a stimulus-response causal  law,  in economics
human action was seen as the product of environment causal forces and the individual
was seen as a “mechanism of commutation.” One of the consequences was the success of
mechanistic and deterministic theories of human economic behavior. As Veblen argued:
The purpose of the valuation process through which the impulse is so conveyed,
human  nature  may,  therefore,  be  accepted  as  uniform;  and  the  theory  of  the
valuation process may be formulated quantitatively, in terms of the material forces
affecting the human sensory and of their equivalents in the resulting activity. In
the  language  of  economics,  the  theory  of  value  may  be  stated  in  terms  of  the
consumable  goods  that  afford  the  incentive  to  effort  and  the  expenditure
undergone in order to procure them. Between these two there subsists a necessary
equality; but the magnitudes between which the equality subsists are hedonistic
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magnitudes,  not  magnitudes  of  kinetic  energy  nor  of  vital  force,  for  the  terms
handled are sensuous terms. (Veblen 1899b: 414-5)
31 According to Veblen, the problem of such a perspective was its onthological assumption
of the measurability of such an equality of magnitudes, although such an assumption was
based only in a methodological and conceptual need. The associationist psychology at the
basis of economic theory was in this respect highly inappropriate since it conceived man
as a passive isolated datum:
The human material with which the inquiry is concerned is conceived in hedonistic
terms; that is to say in terms of a passive and substantially inert and immutably
given  nature.  The  psychological  and  anthropological  preconceptions  of  the
economists  have  been  those  which  were  accepted  by  psychological  and  social
sciences  some  generations  ago.  The  hedonistic  conception  of  man  is  that  of  a
lightning  calculator  of  pleasures  and  pains,  who  oscillates  like  a  homogeneous
globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the
area, but leave him intact […]. He is an isolated definitive human datum, in stable
equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one
direction or another. (Veblen 1898a: 389)
32 Hence psychophysics had contributed to legitimate hedonism (utility)  as a ground of
legitimacy  and  a  guide  in  the  normalization  of  knowledge  in  economics  and  ethics
(Veblen 1899b: 414 ss.).
33 However, as also Mead suggested already in 1894, physics needed to rethink the logical
apparatus through which it looked at perceptual phenomena because, only by changing
the logical apparatus, could it defeat its limits (limits that Mead (1903) later would extend
to various psychological theories). Analogously, according to Veblen the reference to the
notion  of  “organic  activities”  would  help  overcome  the  mechanistic  approach  to
economic phenomena. He then referred explicitly to the “reflex arc” concept, in line with
Dewey’s and Mead’s ideas about organic activity:
The causal sequence in the “reflex arc” is, no doubt, continuous; but the continuity
is not, as formerly, conceived in terms of spiritual substance transmitting a shock:
it is conceived in terms of the life activity of the organism. Human conduct, taken
as the reaction of  such an organism under stimulus,  may be stated in terms of
tropism, involving, of course, a very close-knit causal sequence between the impact
and the response, but at the same time imputing to the organism a habit of life and
a self-directing and selective attention in meeting the complex of forces that make
up its environment. The selective play of this tropismatic complex that constitutes
the organism’s  habit  of  life  under  the impact  of  the forces  of  the environment
counts as discretion.
So far, therefore, as it is to be placed in contrast with the hedonistic phase of the
older psychological doctrines, the characteristic feature of the newer conception is
the recognition of a selectively self-directing life process in the agent. (Veblen 1900:
247)
34 Such a new conception refers to human agents not as calculators of pleasures and pain,
but rather as acting teleologically, that is, as “a coherent structure of propensities and
habits which seek realization and expression in an unfolding activity,” while desires and
attitudes  under  whose  guidance  the  action  take  place  are:  “circumstances  of
temperament which determine the specific direction in which the activity will unfold
itself in the given case” (Veblen 1898a: 390). By “circumstances of temperament,” Veblen
means  those  elements  which  specify  the  character  of  the  individual.  They  are  the
“products of his hereditary traits and his past experience, cumulatively wrought out
under a given body of traditions, conventionalities, and material circumstances” (Veblen
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1898a: 390). Also the main reference to temperament here is a pragmatist one, for James
speaks of ‘temperament’ in various parts of his Principles, referring to attitudes of human
character  in  terms  of  “balanced temperament,”  “irascible  temperament,”  “emotional
temperament,” etc.
35 Hence the activity is the substantial fact of the process, whereas the individual
is but a single complex of habits of thought, and the same psychical mechanism
that  expresses  itself  in  one  direction  as  conduct  expresses  itself  in  another
direction as knowledge. The habits of thought formed in the one connection, in
response to stimuli that call for a response in terms of conduct, must, therefore,
have their effect when the same individual comes to respond to stimuli that call for
a response in terms of knowledge. The scheme of thought or of knowledge is in
good part a reverberation of the scheme of life. (Veblen 1899: 143)
36 Veblen’s  references to notions such as  “reflex arc,”  “organic  activity,”  and “habit  of
thought,” confirm that he was acquainted with Dewey’s and Mead’s psychology as the
“later  psychology”  that  would  enable  economic  interests  to  be  rooted  in  a  social
psychological dimension.
37 There are, therefore, some important affinities between the two perspectives, namely
Dewey’s and Mead’s psychology, and Veblen’s evolutionary economics. What is clear is
the  role  functiontalist  psychology  played  in  Veblen’s  suggestions  concerning  a  new
approach to economics.19 What is less clear is the role the theory of emotion played in his
ideas, even if, as we have seen, the same theory is at the base of organic circuit theory.
38 Nevertheless, Veblen’s further development of human social agency seem to me to be
consonant with Mead’s explanation of the passage from emotion to social interest as well
as  with  the  general  pragmatist  approach  to  the  problem-solving  theory  of  human
development.
39 According  to  Mead  an  emotion  represents  the  correlation  of  instinctive  stimuli  to
aesthetic stimuli and the common basis of the ontogeny and phylogeny of consciousness.
Actually,  Mead  did  not  explain  in  his  abstract  that  we  analyzed  above  either  the
correlation between instinctive and aesthetic stimuli or the link between the latter as
social stimuli (war and love dances) and the organism’s response to it. Nevertheless, he
did so in a fragment that seems to be the natural extension of the abstract I am analyzing
and that Mead probably composed around 1896.20 In this fragment he suggested that, in
the excessive emotional content expressed in acts such as those of war and love dances,
and their individual expressions as rapine or pathological expressions of the sexual act,
“we  find  in  the  first  place  that  the distinction  between  them  and  other  emotional
expressions lies in the distinction between interest and passion of one sort or another.”21
Two  things  have  to  be  explained  here,  that  is,  the  presence  of  excessive  emotional
contents,  and  their  relation  to  social  developments.  According  to  Mead,  there  is  a
distinction  between  ‘interest’ and  ‘passion’ (the  latter  including  all  kinds  of  passion),
regarding their difference in the expression of the emotional content. Emotional content
is  present in the former throughout the whole act  and cannot be separated from it,
whereas  in  the  latter  it  absorbs  the  whole  consciousness  and,  if  the  act  is  not
accomplished,  the  emotion  is  still  aroused.  The  progress  of  more  controlled  actions
consists in transforming potential reflex actions – expressions of strong emotional power
–  into  actions  characterized by  interest and not by  passion.  The  possibility  of  further
advancement is attained “through the socializing of processes which have been strictly
individual up to this point.”22
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40 The  distinction  between  ‘interest’  and  ‘passion’  marks  the  dividing  line  between
individual  instincts  connected  to  immediate  consummation  of  needs  and  the  social
instincts – e.g the urge to fight is an outgrowth of the process of food consumption, that is,
a socializing process of something primarily individual.23
41 It is noteworthy that at this time Mead was already taking his first steps towards a social
perspective in psychology and that, even if Dewey was aware of the need for a “theory of
consciously organic activity” to explain the organism’s biological function of adaptation
to natural environment,24 for his part, Mead was moving in that direction and perhaps
this would better contribute to Veblen’s idea of “biological psychology.”
42 Now, as Veblen argued in line with Mead’s theory, the responding organism is an “agent”
whose intelligent behavioral response to stimulus is of a teleological character and that
intelligence is “of the nature of an inhibitive selection” (Veblen 1919: 6).  The human
process of the evolution of habits and dispositions begins hence with the interruption of
an act and the reply to social  and natural  stimuli  through an interaction that is  not
merely mechanical:
Like other animals, man is an agent that acts in response to stimuli afforded by the
environment in which he lives. Like other species,  he is a creature of habit and
propensity. But in a higher degree than other species, man mentally digests the
content of the habits under whose guidance he acts, and appreciates the trend of
these habits and propensities. He is in an eminent sense an intelligent agent. By
selective  necessity  he  is  endowed with  a  proclivity  for  purposeful  action.  He  is
possessed of a discriminating sense of purpose, by force of which all futility of life
or  of  action  is  distasteful  to  him.  There  may  be  a  wide  divergence  between
individuals as regards the form and the direction in which this impulse expresses
itself, but the impulse itself is not a matter of idiosyncrasy, it is a generic feature of
human nature. (Veblen 1898b: 188-9)
43 And  as  Veblen  repeated  some  years  later,  human  instincts leave  the  field  open  for
adaptation of behavior to circumstances. In man “habit takes on more of a cumulative
character,  in  that  the  habitual  acquirements  of  the  race  are  handed  on  from  one
generation to the next by tradition, training, education” (Veblen 1914: 38-9). Once the
habits are acquired under given circumstances and impulses, a given line of behavior
becomes habitual  and so installed by use as  a  principle of  conduct  handed down by
community (Veblen 1914: 50). These habits are, in other words, the rules under whose the
institutions arise. Institutions, in fact, have the nature of prevailing habits of thought
reflecting habits of life embedded in institutional structures of society, they hence are
mental attitudes that are settled and prevalent,25 being at the basis of men’s ordering
their lives.26 Economic life is identified with community life, for it contributes to shape
conventions and ways of social life. However, economic development also influences the
evolutionary  processes  of  culture,  shaping  a  complex  organism  of  habits  and
personalities.
44 As Veblen argued, in a sense in line with Dewey’s and Mead’s psychology, economic interest
is a social interest as are aesthetic, sexual, humanitarians, and religious interests:
Since each of these passably isolable interests is a propensity of the organic agent
man, with his complex of habits of thought, the expression of each is affected by
habits  of  life  formed under the guidance of  all  the rest.  There is,  therefore,  no
neatly isolable range of cultural phenomena that can be rigorously set apart under
the head of economic institutions, although a category of “economic institutions”
may be of service as a convenient captation, comprising those institutions in which
the  economic  interest  most  immediately  and  consistently  finds  expression,  and
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which most immediately and with the least limitation are of an economic bearing.
(Veblen 1898a: 393)
45 According to Veblen, the economic history of individuals and social groups is the product
of a cumulative trend of adaptation between means and ends. This strongly contrasted
with the utilitarian perspective, according to which society is the sum of individuals. On
the contrary, the perspective inversion from an individualistic to a social approach would
overcome  the  idea  that  economic  interests  are  only  individual  interests.  As  Veblen
argued,  the  consequence  of  the  transition  to  the  new  conception  of  human  nature
construed in terms of functioning is that the newer view formulates conduct in terms of
personality,  whereas  the  earlier  view  was  content  to  formulate  it  in  terms  of  its
provocation and its by-product (Veblen 1900: 248).27
 
4. Conclusion
46 In the works that Veblen published at the University of Chicago we find a curious blend of
Peirce’s logical approach and a pragmatist conceptualization of human conduct that has
its roots, besides James’ functionalism, in Dewey’s and Mead’s functionalism. It seems
that some of Veblen’s ideas are consonant with what Dewey and Mead were working on at
the time. As it has been noted Veblen developed his theory of intelligent human conduct
in the behavioral setting of stimulus and response. However, it was not a reductionist
approach to  human behavior,  namely  a  sort  of  Watsonian behavioristic  approach in
which reason is reduced to a mere chooser’s rationality (Kilpinen 1999: 199), rather much
more a Dewey’s and Mead’s pragmatic behavioral approach to human conduct in wich
reflective reasoning is part of the transaction between organism and environment. It is
for that reason that I choosed to focus on the period 1896-1900 mainly, because the period
represents  in  my  view  a  high  water  mark  in  the  influence  of  Dewey’s  and  Mead’s
psychology  on  Veblen’s  thought.  Hence  it  is  possible  to  better  comprehend  the
theoretical  framework  Veblen  referred  to  when  elaborating  his  first  ideas  of  an
evolutionary  economics.  It  is  also  easier  to  understand  why  he  rejected  both  the
individual  and  society  as  the  ultimate  unity  of  explanation  in  the  social  sciences,
searching for a balance between these two extremes.
47 Although he has sometimes used improperly psychological  notions such as  ‘instinct,’
‘habits of thought,’ ‘dispositions,’ ‘aptitudes,’ etc.,28 he used these notions as a framework
in which insert his reflections upon economic institutions and social change. Moreover,
such ambiguity on the use of psychological notions was due to the fact that, at the time,
empirical  psychology  was  taking  its  first  steps.  It  was  not  a  discipline  with
methodological  and  conceptual  autonomy.  Functionalism  was  still  dependent  upon
natural  sciences and methaphysics.29 One should bear in mind that  concepts  such as
‘instinct’ and ‘behavior’ at the time meant something different from what they would
mean decades after.
48 Veblen’s evolutionary economics has to be included with Dewey’s and Mead’s psychology
among those post-Darwinian non-reductionist  interpretations of  the bio-psycho-social
nature of human conduct. On the one hand, Veblen’s call for a change of methodological
paradigm brought in light the fallacy of the fact/value dicothomy; on the other hand, he
gave voice to the need for a methodological renewal process beginning from a organic
interpretation of human behavior and formation of habits.30
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NOTES
1. For a critical review of James’s receipt of Darwin’s theory see Franzese 2009.
2. On this aspect see Baggio 2011.
3. In particular,  according to Hodgson (1998),  Veblen elaborated his ideas concerning a non-
reductionist evolutionary economics under the influence of Peirce and James as well as being
indirectly shaped by Cowny Lloyd Morgan who in 1896 gave a lecture on the author of Habit and
Instinct at the University of Chicago. Morgan’s thesis that human evolution occurred mainly at a
socio-economic emergent level  not  explicable  in  terms of  the biological  characteristics  of  the
individuals involved influenced Veblen’s ideas on the evolutionary process of the selection of
institutions. Lawson (2015: 1019-22) suggests that during his life Veblen changed his reference to
evolution  theory,  passing  from  referring  to  a  natural  selection  to  a  process  of  behavioral
habituation due to his passage from a initial influence by the evolutionary writings of Herbert
Spencer (in the Leisure Class) to a more Darwinian one. However, though it has been claimed that
in his period in Chicago Veblen was mainly influenced by Jaques Loeb’s reductionist meccanicist
Darwinism, to which the influence of Peirce and James joined as a result of Veblens’ moving away
from the biological reductionism of Spencer (Hodgson 1998: 417), both a careful analysis of the
terms and expressions used by Veblen’s works of these years and a comparison with Dewey’s and
Mead’s preceding writings will show some other elements of the influences on his thinking. In
particular, the notion of habit is also at the basis of Peirce’s logic as well as Dewey’s and Mead’s
functionalism they were elaborating in those very years. On the Darwinist influence on Veblen’s
evolutionary economics, see also Raymer 2013. 
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4. For a reconstruction of Veblen’s analysis of orthodox economics see Nabers (1958: 77-111). For
a comparison of Mead’s and Veblen’s ideas, see the third chapter of Tilman 1996; and Fontana,
Tilman, & Roe 1992. The work of Fontana et al. is interesting, but it considers mainly Mead’s
posthumous works that offer a more sociological and philosophical (and in a certain manner
imperfect) interpretation of Mead’s thought. Such kind of reading does not see Mead’s theory of
the Self as continuous with his psychological studies and reflections developed since his early
collaboration with Dewey from 1890s. Such a comparison would offer a new perspective from
which  to  look  at  some  common  elements  between  Mead’s  psychology  and  Veblen’s  first
elaboration of evolutionary economics. I work on this point in Baggio 2015.
5. On Peirce’s influence upon Veblen’s thought see Kilipinen 1999, 2003; Griffin 1998; Liebhafsky
1993; and Hall & Whybrow 2008.
6. On  the  relationship  between  Peirce’s  theory  of  scientific  creativity  and  evolutionary
economics  of  Veblen see  Dyer  (1986).  For  a  comparison between Veblen’s  ideas  and Peirce’s
mathematical concerns as well as his alleged belief in laissez faire capitalism see Kilpinen (1999:
192-5).  Though I  agree  with  Kilpinen’s  idea  that  Veblen’s  conception of  rationality  refers  to
Pierce’s logic (Kilpinen 2003: 298-300),  I  also suggest in this article that his notion of human
conscious  and  intelligent  behavior  is  well  rooted  in  the  psychological  and  anthropological
framework of the Chicago functionalism of Dewey and Mead.
7. On Peirce’s thought applied to the methods of fixation of economic belief see the interesting
article of Backhouse (1994).
8. Cf. Griffin 1992, 1986. On James’ contribution to economics, see Lawlor 2006; and Barbalet 2008.
9. In their article Angell and Moore credit both Dewey and Mead with the guidance that provided
the interpretation presented in the article. 
10. The intellectual relationship between Dewey and Mead has been interpreted in controversial
ways, in particular in reference to the foundation of the Chicago School of functionalism. Gary
Cook (1993), for instance, considers Dewey to be the founder of functionalism, from which Mead
elaborated his social psychology. David L. Miller (1973) has contended that the insights that form
the foundation of functionalist psychology are Mead’s, and that Dewey adopted the ideas from
his friend and colleague. Miller’s interpretation has been partially confirmed also by Dewey’s
daughter (Dewey 1951: 26). Whilst I have difficulty accepting one side of this contention, it can be
reasonably inferred from the crediting of both Dewey and Mead a collaborative effort to develop
the key ideas of functionalism. On this point see Baggio (2015: 15-29).
11. According to Andrew Backe (2001:  323-40),  Dewey’s  own psychology was based primarily
upon  the  neo-Hegelian  philosophy  of  Thomas  Hill  Green.  Backe’s  interpretation  of  Dewey’s
psychology leads to the conclusion that early Chicago functionalism should not be regarded as a
unified theoretical approach.
12. Jim Garrison (2003) argues that Dewey’s theory of emotions already presents the basis for the
next theory of the reflex arc concept.  However, he does not consider Mead’s contribution to
Dewey’s functionalism to be so important.
13. Dewey’s letter  to  James  Rowland  Angell  (The  Correspondence  of  John  Dewey,  Volume  1:
1871-1918, May 1893, electronic edition).
14. The notion of communicative gesture will be in the next years at the basis of Mead’s and
Dewey’s theory of communicative interaction as the core of social development of meanings and
Selves. It has to be noted that according to these authors communication is not intended to be
linguistically (or propositionally) only, and meanings are not seen as mentalistic or ideational (as
Pratten 2015 seems to argue), but rather as behavioral (Mead 1904: 377-8, 1934: 78-9; and Dewey
1929: 137). Meanings, in fact, are related to the dispositions to respond to certain vocal gestures
which emotional attitudes are primitive expressions.
15. It is interesting to note that Panksepp (2001) has now advanced a similar explanation of the
emotions.  He  addresses  the  need  to  complement  neurophysiological  terms  with  behavioral,
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psychological,  and  cerebral  explanations  of  emotions,  in  a  triangulation  which  he  defines
“affective neuroscience.”
16. Some  years  later,  Mead  (1936:  392  ss.)  defined  Dewey’s  psychology  as  a  “behavioristic
psychology,” distinguishing two ways of elaborating the general point of view of behaviorism.
Watson’s approach considers the process in an external way only, and Dewey’s approach “carries
with  it  the  various  values  which  we  had  associated  with  the  term  ‘consciousness’.”  It  is
noteworthy  that  Watson  conducted  his  doctoral  studies  at  the  University  of  Chicago  under
Angell’s guidance, eventually defining his own behaviorism as “the only consistent and logical
funcionalism” (Watson 1913: 166).
17. To be exact, the essay “Emotion and Instinct” remained unpublished until 2001.
18. See also Dewey (1894b: 158). The explanation of the rhythmical character of action represents
the  most  important  contribution  of  Mead’s  physiological  perspective  to  Dewey’s  theory  of
emotions, according to whom: “all well-arranged or economical action is rhythmical.”
19. As we find also in Veblen’s 1906 essay “The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,” he refers
to  the  “pragmatic”  school  of  psychologists  accepting  that  “all  learning  is  of  a  “pragmatic”
character; that knowledge is inchoate action inchoately directed to an end; that all knowledge is
“functional”; that it is of the nature of use. This, of course, is only a corollary under the main
postulate of the latter-day psychologists, whose catchword is that The Idea is essentially active”
(Veblen 1919: 5). We totally agree with Kilipinen’s comparison of Veblen’s words on pragmatic
psychologists with his suggestion about the possible development of a new conception of human
reasoning in such an endeavour as that of Kant’s third Critique (Veblen 1884; see Kilpinen 1999:
196). However, I want to stress the distinction between the notion of idea as aim of an act (Dewey
1895:  170-1) and trascendental  Aim of human beings (as in Kant’s  trascendental  philosophy),
even though Veblen argued to be not interested to teleological details of conduct,  criticizing
marginal utility economics based on such details (Veblen 1919).
20. Mead’s  “Untitled  fragment  on  the  relation  between  evolution,  the  development  of
intelligence,  and  the  control  of  emotion,  passion,  or  reflex  action”  (George  Herbert  Mead
Collected Papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Box X, Folder 30).
21. Ibid.: 3.
22. Ibid.: 6.
23. Ibid.: 7. Cf. Dewey (1895: 185). 
24. This is testified also in Dewey’s review of Lester F. Ward’s The Psychic Factors of Civilization in
which  Dewey  claimed  that:  “The  biological  theory  of  society  needs  reconstruction  from the
standpoint  of  the  recognition  of  the  significance  of  intellect, emotion,  and impulse”  (Dewey
1894a: 210).
25. General value of habits are something “common to the generality of men” (Veblen 1919: 239).
26. Lawson  challenges  Hodgson’s  depiction  of  Veblen’s  account  of  habit  (Hodgson  2004),
according to which the notion of habit, which origin is rooted in the pragmatist philosophers and
instinct  psychologists,  “is  a  propensity  to  behave  in  particular  way  in  a  particular  class  of
situations”  (Hodgson  2004:  652).  Contrary  to  what  Hodgson  argues,  Lawson  (2015:  999-1002)
suggests that the ideas of habits and of instituions as settled habits are derived to Veblen directly
from Kant’s philosophy. In my opinion, though Veblen was influenced by Kant thought, and in
particular by Kant’s Critique of Judgment,  it is more plausible that his Kantian legacy has been
mediated by his Peircean background. On this point see also Griffin (1998: 739-40).
27. Whilst  after  1908  Veblen  referred  to  McDougall’s  social  psychology,  it  is  plausible  to
hypothesize that his general interest in social psychology would have been influenced, at least in
part, by the pragmatist and behavioristic conceptualization that he developed at Chicago. It is, in
fact, thanks to a psychological idea Veblen assimilated in the period 1896-1900 that he found
some  “familiarity”  with  McDougall’s  social  psychology.  McDougall  rooted  individual
consciousness  in  social  instinct,  highlighting  the  interaction  between  social  and  biological
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dimensions of the organic circuit. However, as we have seen, some years before Dewey and Mead
elaborated the theoretical framework in which McDougall after inserted his work, in particular
Mead’s theorizing of the passage from the instinctive to symbolic stimuli  as the basis of  the
qualitative  distinction  between  emotion  and  interest.  See  in  particular  Veblen  (1914:  Ch.1.);
Tworney 1998; and Dugger (1979: 430).
28. Cf. Maybarry (1969: 317 ss.). Tilman (1996: 93) pointed out that the ambiguity of meaning
Veblen uses the notion of “instinct” would gathered from the ambiguous use James did in his
Principles  of  Psychology.  In effect,  James defined instincts  as:  “the habits  to which there is  an
innate tendency” (James 1890: 68). He also spoke of “instinctive impulses” (James 1890: 198).
29. Hence James’ inferential, rather than ontological, use of the term ‘soul’ in the Principles of
Psychology (James 1890: 3-4, 1892: 400).
30. For a discussion of the concept of habit in economic analysis see Waller 1988, and in sociology
Camic 1986.
ABSTRACTS
In the following pages I shall sketch some thoughts on Veblen’s implicit and explicit references
to  pragmatism  and  functional  psychology,  arguing  that,  besides  Peirce  and  James,  the
functionalist theories and psychological experiments of the research group led by Dewey and
Mead  at  the  University  of  Chicago  set  the  scene  for  Veblen’s  intellectual  revolution.  More
precisely, whilst Veblen did not mention it explicitly, it is possible to find in his writings of the
years 1896-1900 references to Dewey’s notion of the “organic circuit” and to Dewey’s and Mead’s
theory of emotion.* 
This  paper  has  three  parts  and  three  aims.  In  the  first  part,  I  outline  Veblen’s  criticism  of
economic science and his proposal for a new evolutionary economics, paying particular attention
to Veblen’s implicit reference to Peirce’s logic. In the second part, I single out Veblen’s reference
to Dewey’s and Mead’s works on functional psychology. In the third part, I will compare Mead’s
hypothesis of the genesis of social interests in emotions with the evolutionary economic theory
sketched by Veblen.
*  Tilman (1996:  Ch 3)  argued over  pragmatic  influences  upon Veblen’s  ideas  concerning the
human mind.  James  and Dewey’s  functional  psychology offered a  psychological  basis  for  his
social  theory.  In my opinion,  however,  Veblen has been influenced by the Chicago School of
functionalism more than by James’ functionalism, in particular by Dewey’s and Mead’s ideas.
Moreover,  even  if  Tilman  (1998)  points  out  Dewey’s  intellectual  debt  to  Veblen’s  idea,  his
references consist normally in a period later than that considered here.
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